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Abstract 
 
We argue that conflict over immigration largely concerns who bears the burden of cultural 
transaction costs, which we define as the costs associated with overcoming cultural barriers (e.g., 
language) to social exchange. Our framework suggests that the ability of native-born citizens to 
push cultural transaction costs onto immigrant outgroups serves as an important expression of 
social dominance. In two novel studies, we demonstrate that social dominance motives  
condition emotional responses to encountering cultural transaction costs, shape engagement in 
cultural accommodation behavior toward immigrants, and affect immigration attitudes and 
policy preferences.  
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If politics is about who gets what, when, and how (Lasswell, 1936), then the cultural 
politics of immigration can be characterized by conflict over who culturally accommodates 
whom, when, and by how much.  At its most basic level, immigration engenders intercultural 
contact, where actors from distinct cultural groups are forced to interact with one another.  One 
inescapable reality of such intergroup contact is that one or both parties must expend resources to 
overcome differences in culture and language to facilitate effective interaction, communication, 
and exchange. We argue that one important dimension of political conflict over immigration 
concerns whether it is immigrants or native-born citizens who will pay the costs associated with 
reconciling these cultural differences. 
While the economic side of the politics of immigration in the U.S. tends to revolve 
around issues of labor market competition, wage and salary levels, the consumption of public 
services, and eligibility for government benefits (Olzak, 1992; Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993; 
Passel and Fix,1994; Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong, 1997; Hero and Preuhs, 2007), the 
cultural side concerns issues such as official language policy (Citrin, Reingold, Walters, and 
Green, 1990; Schildkraut, 2001), bilingual and multicultural education (Huddy and Sears, 1995; 
Citrin, Kiley, and Pearson, 2003), cultural competence in government and business services 
(Dresser, 2005; Wu and Martinez, 2006), and definitionsof our national identity (Citrin, 
Reingold, and Green, 1990; Citrin and Wright, 2009; Huntington, 2004).  We argue that the 
issues that comprise the cultural side of the conflict can be largely distilled down to controversy 
over the distribution of the costs associated with assimilation and cultural accommodation.  By 
shaping the balance of immigrant assimilation to Anglo-American culture (and vice versa), these 
culturally-RULHQWHGSROLFLHVLQLWLDWHDSROLWLFDODUHQDLQZKLFKSROLF\GHFLVLRQVRYHU³ZKR
DFFRPPRGDWHVZKRP´IDFLOLWDWHVFRPSHWLWLRQIRUJURXSVWDWXVDQGWKHH[SUHVVLRQRIVRFLDO
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dominance.  As Paxton and Mughan note: ³-XVWDVeconomic threat is the key concept in 
understanding material intergroup relations, assimilation is the key concept in understanding 
cultural LQWHUJURXSUHODWLRQV´ 
In this article, we test an integrated theory of the cultural politics of immigration that 
fuses literature from political economy and political psychology.  From political economy, we 
borrow the concept of transaction costsoriginating from market exchanges between buyers and 
sellers and argue that there are cultural transaction costsrelated to immigration which must be 
assumed by immigrants, native-born citizens, or bothto allow for WKHVXFFHVVIXO³H[FKDQJH´RI
RQHFRXQWU\¶VQDWLYHVLQWRDQRWKHU¶VVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOERG\  From political psychology, we 
draw upon the intergroup relations literature and argue that the conflict which emerges over 
resolving cultural transaction costs can best be understood through the lens of social dominance 
theory, which stipulates that groups are hierarchically structured in society and that intergroup 
conflict arises from competition for dominant group status.Paralleling the type of power manifest 
in an asymmetrical distribution of transaction costs by a buyer onto a seller, we argue that the 
ability to impose an asymmetrical incurrence of cultural transaction costs onto immigrants serves 
as a powerful expression of the dominant status of the native-born cultural majority over 
immigrant minorities.  As such, we rely on the concept of social dominance orientation (SDO) to 
tapindividual differences in chronic social dominance motives. We contend that differences in 
these motives should influence how individualswill react to encounteringcultural transaction 
costs, as well as their propensity toward pushing these costs onto immigrant minorities as an 
opportunity to express social dominance. 
 In two novel studies, we provide evidence of our theory of the cultural politics of 
immigration. In Study 1, we assess how social dominance motives shape reactions to an 
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experimentally manipulated cultural transaction cost. In Study 2, we constructed a forum that 
allowed us to observe the impact of social dominance motives on real behaviors toward cultural 
outgroups. In sum, this article makes several important contributions to the study of immigration 
and intercultural relations.  First, our analyses demonstrate that restrictive and ethno-nativist 
immigration policy preferences,as well as the perception that immigrants threaten American 
culture, can be traced to the intersection of individual differences in social dominance motives 
and real intercultural contact experiences.  Second, we contribute to the literature on social 
dominance orientation by extendingthe application of this theorywithin the domainof 
immigration and intercultural relations.  Extant work on SDOhas documented its importance as a 
predictor of racial and cultural attitudes (Esses et al., 2001; Pratto et al., 1994); however, our 
research demonstrates itsimportance to behaviors toward members of cultural outgroups. And 
finally, our theoryprovides a compelling illustration of the analytical merits of an 
interdisciplinary and interactionist approach to the study of politics (Greenstein, 1992). That is, 
our theoretical framework integrates economicand psychological conceptstoaddress the interplay 
of personality and contextual experiences in the realm of immigration. 
CULTURAL TRANSACTION COSTS 
To flesh out our concept of cultural transaction costs, we turn to the field of political 
economy. Transaction costs are defined as the costs other than the moneythat are incurred when 
trading goods and services.  Transaction costs typically involve the expenditure of time, effort, 
and other resources associated with locating and making contact with a trade partner, bargaining 
and negotiating the terms of an exchange, transporting and delivering goods and services, and 
monitoring and enforcing contracts (Coase, 1960; North, 1990; Johnson, 2010).  One key insight 
from political economy is that most, if not all, market exchanges involve transaction costs, and 
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that many otherwise mutually beneficial exchanges are inhibited because the benefits of an 
exchange do not exceed the costs of transacting.  In order for a market exchange to take place, 
one or both of the trade partners (or some third party) must incur the transaction costs.  
Downs (1957) is one of the first scholars to apply transaction costs to political behavior 
by arguing that non-participation in the electoral process is rational because of the costs 
associated with obtaining political information to make decisions about candidates and policies.  
As the field of political economy grew, the concept was applied to a wide range of political 
phenomena, such as the evolution of political institutions (North, 1990), the formation of 
political parties (Aldrich, 1995), relations between Congress and the bureaucracy (Huber and 
Shipan, 2000), the public policymaking process (Levine and Forrence, 1990), and the design of 
administrative agencies (Wood and Bohte, 2004).  At present, however, the concept of 
transaction costs has not been fruitfully applied to the realm of intercultural relations, nor has it 
been used to explain political conflicts that arise over the cultural impacts of immigration. 
From a neo-classical economic framework, immigration can be conceptualized as an 
exchange between immigrant-sending and -receiving states (Cornelius, 2005). One of the key 
features associated with immigration as an exchange is that it entails localized intercultural 
contact, where actors from different cultural groups come into prolonged, direct contact with one 
another.  We define cultural transaction costs as the resources that must be expended to reconcile 
cultural differences between distinct groups for the purpose of enabling a market or social 
exchange. The size of thecultural transaction costs that arise from immigration is a function of 
the distance between the cultures of the immigrating group and the native-born citizen within the 
receiving country.  The term ³cultural distance´ is used to describe the entiretyof differences in 
values, beliefs, norms, customs, and language between distinct cultural entities (Earley, Ang & 
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Tan, 2006; Shenkar, 2001).  In addition to serving as the point of origin for and primary 
determinant of the magnitude of cultural transaction costs, cultural distance is also stipulated as a 
key factor in shaping the degree to which the influx of an immigrant group activates native 
perceptions of cultural threat and concern over the maintenance of cultural identities (Brown, 
1995; Sniderman et al., 2004).   
SOCIAL DOMINANCE AND CULTURAL ACCOMMODATION 
Of the variety of personality traits identified in the study of political behavior, social 
dominance orientation (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999) is an individual difference factor that should 
strongly shape emotional, attitudinal, and behavioral orientations to intercultural relations and 
accommodation. Social dominance theory stipulates that human societies tend to be structured as 
systems of group-based social hierarchies, in which most forms of intergroup conflict can be 
regarded as manifestations of the basic human predisposition to form and maintain hierarchical 
group relations (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999, 31-38).  According to this theory, group inequality is 
perpetuated through hierarchy-enhancing forces.  The possession and expression of social 
dominance motives among individual actors is argued to constitute a primary force in 
maintaining group inequalities. Central to social dominance theory is the concept of social 
dominance orientation (SDO); an individual difference factor theorized to capture variation in 
individuals¶desire and expressed support for group-based inequality and social dominance. 
Individuals high in SDO are argued to enhance hierarchies by supporting institutional 
arrangements, social norms, and formal policies,which maintain and produce ever higher levels 
of group-based social inequality.  
From the perspective of social dominance theory, the groups that are likely to fall target 
to social dominance motivesare those that are salient in society and define sharp power 
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differentials between groups.  In the U.S. context, race and ethnicity have long been salient and 
GHILQLQJIHDWXUHVRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VJURXS-based social hierarchies. Aside from racial conflict 
between whites and blacks, immigration and ethnic conflict between native-born citizens and 
immigrants historically, and contemporaneously, constitutes a salient domain of political 
conflict.  According to our perspective, cultural conflict ensues when native-born citizens 
encounter an unfamiliar culture from unassimilated immigrants, and this conflict deepens when 
formal political institutions decide on policies that stand to either perpetuate the hegemony of the 
cultural majority or attenuate it through accommodation of cultural minorities. It is within the 
context of this zero-sum game RIGHFLGLQJ³ZKRDFFRPPRGDWHV ZKRP´WKDWWKHDELOLW\RIWKH
cultural majority to maintain the hegemony of its own values, beliefs, and customs in the face of 
increasing ethnic diversity due to immigration should serve as a potent reflection of its status and 
dominance over foreign-born cultural minorities. 
HYPOTHESES 
A variety of research on intergroup relations and emotions leads to the expectation that 
individuals high in social dominance motives (i.e., SDO) would experience negative emotions, 
such as anger, in response to the imposition of cultural transaction costs.  First, research on 
discrete emotions finds that threats posed by others can lead to anger and aggressive behaviors 
when the self is perceived as strong relative to the other (Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure, 1989; 
Roseman, Wiest, and Swartz, 1994). Building upon this research and extrapolating from the level 
of interpersonal to intergroup relations, scholars argue that the perceived or actual strength of 
RQH¶VJURXSUHODWLYHWRDQRIIHQGLQJRXWJURXSVKRXOGGLFWDWHZKHWKHURQHH[SHULHQFHVDQJHU
(Mackie, Devos, and Smith, 2000).  The experience of anger in response to a threatening action 
from an outgroup, which is appraised as weak or iQIHULRUUHODWLYHWRRQH¶VLQJURXS, should in turn 
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prompt the engagement of hostile or harm-intending actions toward this outgroup.  In sum, this 
body of research strongly suggests that threats from a subordinate outgroup will be met with 
anger, and the experience of anger should mediate the link between the threat and engagement in 
hostile behavior.   
The domain of immigration and intercultural contact provides an interesting and 
relatively untested context in which to import the predictions from this line of research.  Various 
aspects of intercultural contact have been argued to have threatening potential for native-born 
citizens (see Berry, 1997; Hitlan, Kelly, and Zarate, 2010; Anonymous, 2012; Oberg, 1960; 
Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman, 1999), but perhaps none more concrete or acute as the 
experience of language-based threats.  For example, work within cross-cultural psychology 
reveals that language-based barriers to effective communication, interaction, and exchange with 
cultural outgroups can threaten FLWL]HQV¶VHQVHRIWKHLURZQVRFLDODQGFXOWXUDOFRPSHWHQFH
(Castro 2003;LaFromboise, Coleman, and Gerton 1993; Ward and Rana-Deuba 1999). 
Moreover, research on language-based social exclusion demonstrates that the experience of 
language barriers can augment intergroup distinctions, increase the SHUFHSWLRQRI³REVWDFOHV´WR
the ingroup posed by an outgroup (Cottrell and Neuberg 2005), and generate anger toward the 
outgroup (Desteno, Dasgupta, Bartlett, and Cajdric 2004).  
We argue that social dominance motives should strongly condition the degree to which 
encountering cultural transaction costs, in the form of linguistic barriers to completing basic 
tasks or social transactions, should trigger anger and threat.  First, given their chronic social 
dominance motives and attentiveness to dominance relations, citizens high in SDO are more 
likely to perceive immigrants and cultural minorities as occupying an inferior or subordinate 
status (Snellman and Ekehammar, 2005).  Given this, individuals high in SDO should be more 
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likely to perceive language-barriers as offensive,and thus, they should be more likely than low-
SDOs to feel anger in response to these barriers. Indeed, recent research demonstrates that high-
SDOs are more responsive to threats posed by immigrants (Costello and Hodson, 2011). In short, 
we hypothesize that encountering cultural transaction costs should produce anger among those 
high in SDO, which we call the anger hypothesis.   
Extant research on emotions and intergroup relations contendsthat discrete emotions such 
as anger should mediate the link between threatening experiences and intergroup attitudes and 
behavior (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay, 2008; Hitlan et al., 2010; Mackie, Devos, and Smith, 
2000).  In particular, this work strongly suggests that experienced threats from a subordinate 
group should arouse anger, and that this anger should lead to the expression of hostile attitudes 
and the engagement in harm-intending actions toward the threatening group.In the context of 
opinion on immigration, the perception of threats posed by immigrants serves as a strong source 
of anti-immigrant sentiment, and past research finds that threatening cultural experiences²such 
as exposure to a foreign language²can augment the perception that immigrants pose a cultural 
threat (Hopkins, Tran, and Williamson, 2011; Anonymous, 2012). These findings, along with 
those from the intergroup emotions and language exclusion research, suggest that experienced 
cultural transaction costs may indirectly influence policy attitudes by arousing anger, which in 
turn may provoke negative attitudes and beliefs about immigrants and cultural minorities. We 
hypothesize that among those high in SDO, situational experiences of cultural transaction costs 
will arouse feelings of anger, these angry feelings will find cognitive expression inthe belief that 
immigrants pose a threat to American culture, and this belief, in turn, will augment support for 
restrictive and nativist immigration policies. We label this the mediation hypothesis.   
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A graphical representation of the anger and mediation hypotheses is presented in Panel A 
of Figure 1. This figure charts out the expectation that going from minimum to maximum levels 
of SDO among those encountering transaction costs will indirectly enhance cultural threat by 
generating higher levels of angry feelings. Further, this figure shows that the ultimate 
consequence of this process is that SDO (among those encountering cultural transaction costs) 
will indirectly enhance support for restrictive and ethno-nativist immigration policies by 
arousing anger having the anger channeled into the judgment that immigrants are culturally 
threatening. In addition to being grounded in intergroup emotions theory, the hypothesizing of 
anger as causally prior to threat perception and policy attitudes is supported by research on the 
primacy of affect in social judgment and behavior (Zajonc, 1984) and political psychology 
research demonstrating that affect toward encountered social objects occurs very quickly, thus 
preceding and shaping judgments (i.e. cognitions) toward these objects (Lodge and Taber, 2005).  
According to our theoretical framework, the emergence of cultural transactions costs is 
just one side of the coin of intercultural contact; the other pertains to resolving cultural 
differences, which inevitably leads to the issue of cultural accommodation. Moving beyond 
attitudes and into the domain of behavior, there is strong reason to believe that social dominance 
PRWLYHVZLOOSOD\DVLJQLILFDQWUROHLQVKDSLQJLQGLYLGXDOFLWL]HQV¶ZLOOLQJQHVVWRFXOWXUDOO\
accommodate immigrant minorities by incurring cultural transaction costs.  Social dominance 
theorists argue that members of dominant groups, compared to those of subordinate groups, will 
bemore likely to engage in behaviors that benefit themselves and their group.  This behavioral 
asymmetry is known as the ³DV\PPHWULFDOLQJURXSELDV´DQGLVDUJXHGWRFRQVWLWXWHDFRUH
mechanism by which group-based social hierarchies are maintained (Sidanius and Pratto, 
1999).In terms of immigration, this asymmetrical process would be characterized by the desire 
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for immigrants to incur the costs associated withassimilationinto the dominant JURXSV¶FXOWXUH 
and a resistance to paying the costs associated with culturally accommodating immigrant 
minorities.  In other words, individuals high in SDO should want to pushcultural transaction 
costs onto immigrants and avoid incurring such costs. We label this the asymmetrical 
accommodation hypothesis.   
In addition to engaging in status-bolstering, asymmetrical accommodation behavior, we 
also hypothesize that social dominance motives should influence LQGLYLGXDOV¶JHQHUDOGHJUHHRI
positive behavioral engagement with, or friendliness toward, cultural outgroup members.  
Existing work on intergroup behavior demonstrates that in addition to engaging in behaviors 
intended to actively harm a subordinate or disliked outgroup, individuals may also engage in 
passive-harming behaviors toward members of such groups (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007). 
These behaviors can involve excluding, avoiding, ignoring, or neglecting and are intended to 
distance members of these groups from the self, as well as withdraw social support from them.  
We argue that among individuals high in social dominance motives, engagement in active 
dominance enhancing behaviors will coincide with minimally friendly and avoidant(rather than 
engaging) social interaction with cultural immigrant minorities.  We label this the 
disengagement hypothesis.  
Beyond the issues of initial emotional, attitudinal, and behavioral responses to cultural 
transaction costsZHYLHZWKHHPRWLRQDOUHSHUFXVVLRQVRIRQH¶VRZQEHKDYLRUWRZDUGFXOWXUDO
outgroups in these situations as an important area of substantive interest.  We have argued that 
social dominance motives will lead to anger in response to encountering cultural barriers to the 
completion of basic tasks or interactions, as well as asymmetrical cultural accommodation 
behavior and social disengagement in response to contact with cultural outgroups. If 
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encountering cultural barriers when interacting with a member of an outgroup leads to negative 
emotions, then acting out such emotions through status-bolstering and asymmetrical behaviors 
should reduce emotional arousal and the experience of negative emotions. Indeed, extant 
research demonstrates that the maintenance of social dominance over immigrants strongly 
appeals to those high SDO (Pratto and Lemieux, 2001). Given this, we hypothesize that among 
those high in SDO engaging in asymmetrical cultural accommodation behaviors will have a 
³venting´ effect, in which negative emotions (e.g., anger)will be reduced as a byproduct of 
DVVHUWLQJRQH¶VGRPLQDQFHRYHUDVXERUGLQDWHFXOWXUDOJURXSDQGWKHLUPHPEHUV:HODEHOWKLV
the venting hypothesis. 
OVERVIEW OF EXPERIMENTAL AND OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES 
Two separate studies were designed to test our hypotheses concerning the moderating 
role of SDO on LQGLYLGXDOV¶emotional, attitudinal, and behavioral reactions to encountering 
cultural transaction costs.  In Study 1, we conducted an experiment where participants were 
unexpectedly exposed to a Spanish website during the course of completing a basic Internet 
navigation task.  Following this experimental treatment, participants were given a questionnaire 
measuring emotions, perceived threats related to immigration, and policy attitudes. In Study 2 
(observational study), recruited individuals participated in an Internet chat-room, in which they 
interacted with a chat discussant who conversed in English and Spanish. These study 
participantswere given the opportunity to incur or push cultural transaction costs onto their chat 
discussant.In essence, these two studies enable us to assess the effect of individual differences in 
social dominance motives on reactions to key experiences and situations ranging across the 
trajectory of the intercultural contact process, beginning with the simple exposure to an 
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unfamiliar culture (Study 1) and ending with a situation requiring the allocation of cultural 
transaction costs (Study 2). 
STUDY 1 
 In our first study, we confront participants with a cultural transaction cost in the form of 
an unexpected exposure to a Spanish language website during the course of performing a very 
basic Internet website navigation task.  We aimed to have this manipulation imitate the type of 
impersonal and incidental exposures to unfamiliar culture that discomfit basic everyday tasks or 
interactions, such as placing a fast food order, reading a sign, or navigating an automated 
telephone customer service system.  Existing research demonstrates that a large portion of 
$PHULFDQV¶FRQWDFWZLWKLPPLgrants is likely to be characterized by sporadic, informal, and brief 
encounters within specific contexts (e.g., local supermarkets, retail stores, etc.) rather than 
prolonged and intimate settings (Hopkins, 2010).  Further, recent research finds that impersonal 
and incidental exposure to Spanish language can operate as a powerful implicit cue by activating 
feelings of threat and opposition to immigration (Hopkins, Tran, and Williamson, 2010; 
Anonymous, 2012).  
Experimental Design and Procedure 
 One hundred and eleven undergraduate students enrolled in political science courses at a 
large Northeastern university were recruited to participate in this study. Of the 111 students who 
participated, there were slightly more males (58%) than females, 64%identified themselves as 
Caucasian,and ideology and party identification were nearly evenly distributed across the student 
sample, with a slight skew in favor of liberal and democratic identifiers.1Although we make no 
                                                 
1The key form of cultural transaction costs induced in our studies concerned moving from English to a foreign 
language.  As such, we were forced to exclude Asian subjects from the analyses in Studies 1 and 2 because the vast 
majority of these subjects²relative to all other racial groups²were exchange students visiting the U.S. More 
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claims about the representativeness of our sample relative to the general public, we suspect that 
any findings from our data are conservative estimates given that college students tend to be more 
open to experience and have less crystallized social and political attitudes than the general adult 
population (Sears, 1986). 
Upon entering the lab, subjects were informed that they were participating in a consumer 
UHVHDUFKVWXG\LQYHVWLJDWLQJSHRSOH¶VDWWLWXGHVWRZDUGJRYHUQPHQWZHEVLWHV3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUH
instructed that they would be assessing the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles 
(NYSDMV) website, and that they were going to be given three navigation tasks to familiarize 
themselves with that website to evaluate LWV³XVHU-IULHQGOLQHVV´7KHNYSDMV website was 
chosen because at the time of the study (Fall 2009), the English and Spanish versions of the 
website were nearly identical in color, format, and general appearance. For the first navigation 
WDVNDOOSDUWLFLSDQWVUHJDUGOHVVRIFRQGLWLRQZHUHDVNHGWRORFDWHLQIRUPDWLRQDERXW³KRZQHZ
drivers obtDLQDGULYHU¶VOLFHQVHin New York State´$IWHUFRPSOHWLQJWKHILUVWQDYLJDWLRQWDVN
participants closed the DMV website and returned to the main experimental page, where they 
were asked two questions about their findings. After these questions, they were then sent on a 
second and third navigation task which was also followed by questions.    
The sole experimental treatment of the study involved varying what occurred during the 
third navigation task: Participants in the control condition simply searched for specific 
information on the English language DMV website as they had done in the previous two tasks. 
+RZHYHUSDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKHWUHDWPHQWFRQGLWLRQZHUH³DFFLGHQWDOO\´GLUHFWHGWRWKH6SDQLVK
language version of the New York State DMV website to perform a search for information about 
³KRZRQHPLJKWREWDLQFXVWRPDQGSHUVRQDOL]HGOLFHQVHSODWHV´:HUHIHUWRWKLVPDQLSXODWLRQDV
                                                                                                                                                             
importantly, over three-quarters of these students were recent English language learners with high rates of non-
response to survey questions in both studies and to chat discussion questions in Study 2.  
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WKH³:HE6SDQLVK´WUHDWPHQW)RUSDUWLFLSDQWVZLWKOLWWOHWRQR6SDQLVKODQJXDJHDELOLW\
encountering this website truly represented an insurmountable barrier because there was no 
simple button to click to translate the page back into English.  Interestingly, the vast majority of 
study participants exited the Spanish-language page within 10 seconds or less; hence, our Web 
Spanish treatment was clearly incidental. 
Immediately after completing the navigation tasks, all participants answered a series of 
self-reported emotion questions, followed by filler questions (designed to support the cover story 
that the experiment concerned evaluation of a public website), and measures of social dominance 
orientation,2 perceived threat, and policy items related to immigration. An open-ended 
experimental check indicated that less than 2% of the sample explicitly thought the study was 
about immigration, minorities, or culture. Further, no participants believed that the purpose of 
the experiment was to manipulate language exposure or use it as a barrier toward performing the 
navigation task. Last, there was no significant correlation between experimental condition and 
the very small portion of students that reported thinking the experiment had something vaguely 
to do with immigration or culture.    
Measures 
 To assess the role that social dominance motives play in shaping the effect of our 
experimental treatment on emotions and immigration-related attitudes, we used 8 items from the 
original 16-item social dominance orientation scale (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, and Malle, 
7KHVHHLJKWLWHPVZHUHFRPELQHGLQWRDVLQJOHVXPPDWLYHVFDOHĮ 85) and recoded to 
                                                 
2
 One could argue that our measure of SDO might be reactive to the experimental treatment, given that it was 
PHDVXUHGDIWHUH[SRVXUHWRWKH³:HE6SDQLVK´PDQLSXODWLRQ$ simple bivariate regression, however, revealed that 
levels of SDO among the study participants was not significantly influenced by exposure to the treatment (B=.010, 
SE=.010, p=.31). 
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range from 0 to 1, for ease of interpretation (1=high SDO; M=.34, SD=.22). For more 
information about the items used and question wording, see Appendix A. 
7RJDXJHWKHLPSDFWRIRXUWUHDWPHQWRQSDUWLFLSDQWV¶H[SHULHQFHGW\SHDQGOHYHORI
emotional arousal, participants answered 5 anger items adapted from the Positive and Negative 
Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, and Tellegan, 1988). More specifically, subjects 
reported WKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKWKH\IHOW³DQJU\´³XSVHW´³LUULWDEOH´³DQQR\HG´DQG³IUXVWUDWHG´
Response options for each of these five self-UHSRUWHGHPRWLRQTXHVWLRQVUDQJHGIURP³YHU\
slightly´WR³QRWDWDOO´ These five anger items were combined into a single summative scale that 
was recoded to range from 0 to 1 (1=high anger; M=.24, SD=.25) and yielded an inter-item 
UHOLDELOLW\RIĮ 7RPHDVXUHWKHSHUFHSWLRQRIFXOWXUDOWKUHDWSRVHGE\LPPLJUDQWVZH
included a 6-category item derived from Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior (2004).  
5HVSRQGHQWVLQGLFDWHGWKHLUDJUHHPHQWZLWKWKHIROORZLQJVWDWHPHQW³7KHVHGD\V,DPDIUDLG
WKH$PHULFDQFXOWXUHLVWKUHDWHQHGE\LPPLJUDWLRQ´ ´VWURQJO\DJUHH´ 
We measured VXEMHFWV¶LPPLJUDWLRQSROLF\preferences with two items.  First, we asked 
subjects to indicate on a 5-SRLQWVFDOHKRZLPSRUWDQWLWZDVIRUWKH³86JRYHUQPHQWWRZRUNWR
UHWXUQDOOLOOHJDOLPPLJUDQWVEDFNWRWKHLUKRPHFRXQWULHV´Deport Illegals; 5 ³H[WUHPHO\
LPSRUWDQW´On the surface this item addresses preferences over how restrictive or punitive our 
national position toward illegal immigrants should be; however, this item can also be viewed as 
the extent to which individuals want to cut cultural transaction costs by reducing the immigrant 
population.  Second, we included an item that asked participants to report how likely they would 
EHWRVXSSRUW³DVWDWHRUORFDOODZGHFODULQJ(QJOLVKDVWKH2IILFLDO/DQJXDJH"´7KLVLWHP, 
labeled Official English, had 6 response options, ranginJIURP³H[WUHPHO\XQOLNHO\´WR
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³H[WUHPHO\OLNHO\´3This item, within the context of language, should tappreferences regarding 
the macro-level distribution of cultural transaction costs by essentially shaping ³ZKRFXOWXUDOO\
accommodates whom.´ 
All of our models included controls for gender (1=male), birthplace of VXEMHFWV¶parents 
 RQHRUPRUHRIVXEMHFW¶VSDUHQWVZDVERUQRXWVLGHRIWKH86, Spanish language ability 
 VXEMHFWFDQVSHDN6SDQLVK³YHU\ZHOO´, a standard 7-point measure of political ideology 
(1=very conservative)DQGWKHVWUHQJWKRIVXEMHFWV¶QDWLRQDOLdentity (1=strong American 
identity) derived from the 4-item scale used by Sniderman et al. (2004). Race was controlled for 
ZLWKDGXPP\YDULDEOHFRGHG³´IRU&DXFDVLDQVXEMHFWVDQG³´IRUQRQ-white, minority 
subjects.  Information about the correlations between key variables is provided in Appendix B. 
Results 
To test our hypotheses, we estimated a mediated-moderated effects (Baron and Kenny, 
1986; Muller, Judd, &Yzerbyt, 2005) structural equation model (SEM). For our anger 
hypothesis, we interacted SDO with a treatment dummy variable; this interaction contrasts the 
effect of moving from minimum to the maximum levels of SDO among those in the treatment 
compared to those in the control condition.  Our SEM simultaneously estimated four regressions: 
(1) anger on the SDO-by-treatment interaction and control variables, (2) cultural threat on the 
SDO-by-treatment interaction, anger, and controls, (3) Deport Illegals policy item on the SDO-
by-treatment interaction, anger, cultural threat, and controls, and (4) Official English policy item 
on the SDO-by-treatment interaction, anger, cultural threat, and controls. This model allows us to 
                                                 
3The response categories for the ³'HSRUW,OOHJDOV´³QRWDWDOOLPSRUWDQW´³VOLJKWO\LPSRUWDQW´³PRGHUDWHO\
LPSRUWDQW´³TXLWHLPSRUWDQW´DQG³H[WUHPHO\LPSRUWDQW´DQG³2IILFLDO(QJOLVK´³H[WUHPHO\XQOLNHO\´³SUHWW\
XQOLNHO\´³VRPHZKDWXQOLNHO\´³VRPHZKDWOLNHO\´³SUHWW\OLNHO\´DQG³H[WUHPHO\OLNHO\´items contain no neutral 
midpoint.  The decision to exclude the neutral midpoint for these items was done to avoid its over-usage as a default 
response among those subjects reluctant to take a position and/or concerned with social desirability (e.g., see 
Krosnick, 1999). 
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estimate a series of mediated or indirect pathways by which SDO, conditional upon the treatment 
condition, may influence immigration policy preferences.  Due to the ordinal nature of our 
cultural threat item and policy dependent variables, we used ordered probit link functions for 
these equations within our SEM and estimated the parameters using mean and variance adjusted 
weighted least squares in Mplus (Muthén and Muthén 2007). 
 The full results from our SEM are displayed in Table 1 and the core results are displayed 
graphically in Panel B of Figure 1.  The first column contains our findings for the anger model.  
As hypothesized, among those receiving the experimental treatment, higher levels of SDO is 
associated with a significant increase in feelings of anger (B=.34, SE=.17).  A coefficient of .34 
indicates a sizeable effect of an increase in SDO on anger. To be sure, among participants who 
received the treatment, the predicted value on the anger scale for those low in SDO is .22, 
whereas for those highest in SDO the predicted value of anger increases to .56.  We also find a 
statistically significant and negative coefficient on the interaction term (B=-.47, SE=.23), which 
tells us that the marginal effect of moving from the minimum to the maximum value of SDO on 
anger is significantly reduced in the control condition. 
 Moving on to the mediation hypothesis, we turn to the second column in Table 1, which 
displays the effects of SDO, the experimental condition, the interaction of SDO and condition, 
and anger, on cultural threat.  The bottom rows of the table report the indirect effect of SDO 
among those in the treatment condition on cultural threat via its effect on self-reported anger. 
The results reveal that SDO does not directly affect perceived cultural threat among those in the 
treatment condition (B=.47, SE=.72), and there is no significant interaction between SDO and 
experimental condition (B=.34, SE=.98). However, experiencing anger does significantly affect 
perceived cultural threat (B=.92, SE=.42), with increasing anger associated with heightened 
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perception that immigrants threaten American culture.  Although we find that SDO failed to 
exert a direct effect on cultural threat, it did exert a significant indirect effect on cultural threat 
perceptions by its impact on anger (B=.31, SE=.21).4 
 The final pathway to be tested is whether SDO and the Web Spanish treatment, by 
arousing anger and thus enhancing the perception cultural threat, indirectly increased support for 
restrictive and ethno-nativist immigration policies. The third and fourth columns in Table 1 list 
the direct effects of these factors on policy attitudes, as well as the indirect effects of SDO 
(among those in the treatment condition) on immigration policy preferences. First, the results 
reveal that a higher levels of SDO among those in the treatment condition is associated with an 
increase in the probability of supporting a government policy to deport illegal immigrants and 
institute an Official English Language law, though only in the former case did this effect attain 
conventional levels of statistical significance. Further, there are no significant interactions 
between SDO and experimental condition in either policy model, and we see that anger has no 
significant direct effect on either of these policy attitudes.  Second, the results reveal that an 
increase in cultural threat significantly increases the probability of supporting both of these anti-
LPPLJUDQWSROLFLHV³'HSRUWLQJ,OOHJDOV´B=.34, SE=.10³2IILFLDO(QJOLVK´B=.32, SE=.11). 
And last, we find that SDO (among those in the treatment condition) indirectly enhanced support 
for these two policies by arousing anger, which in turn, was associated with higher levels of 
perceived cultural threat. To be sure, the path coefficients listed in these columns test a complex 
pathway of influence: SDO and TreatmentÆAngerÆCultural ThreatÆPolicy Attitude5. To 
                                                 
4
 One potentially problematic feature of our experimental manipulation is that the expression of anger among those 
high in SDO is attributable to having their web browser not working as intended rather than encountering language-
based barriers. This concern, however, is ameliorated by the statistically significant and substantively large link 
between the anger caused by the treatment and reported levels of cultural threat.  
5One possible alternative model to the causal process we stipulate is one in which cultural threat perceptions 
precede feelings of anger. In other words, SDO and receipt of the treatment first arouses perceptions of cultural 
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assess the robustness of these results given our modest sample size, we re-ran our SEM using 
bootstrapped standard errors and confidence intervals for all parameter estimates,and the sign 
and significance of our estimates remain intact.  
Discussion  
We theorized that encountering cultural transaction costs should be experienced by high 
SDOs asa dominance-threatening and status-infringing obstacle posed by a subordinate cultural 
outgroup. Our analyses demonstrate that encountered language-based barriers to the completion 
of basic tasks among high-SDOs activates anger, which in turn augments the perception that 
immigrants pose a threat to American culture, and culminates in increased support for restrictive 
and ethno-nativist immigration policies.  These findings contribute to the immigration opinion 
literature in two respects.  First, they add to existing research exploring the sources of public 
opposition to immigration by showing that a specific type of intercultural contact, when paired 
with social dominance motives, can increase anti-immigrant policy support through the 
generation of negative emotions and cultural threat perceptions. This stands out from existing 
work not only by the complexity of the analyzed causal process underlying policy attitudes, but 
in the exploration of the interplay between personality and situational factors in shaping opinion. 
Second, the findings from this study advance our understanding of the causes of cultural threat 
by demonstrating that threat perceptions can be generated by combining individual social 
dominance motives with anger-inducing real intercultural contact experiences.  
                                                                                                                                                             
threat, which then lead to feelings of anger and ultimately support for restrictive immigration policy. To rule out this 
alternative explanation, we estimated the following SEM: SDO and TreatmentÆCultural ThreatÆAngerÆPolicy 
Attitude.The results from this SEM do not fit the data well, as the path from SDO (conditional upon receipt of the 
treatment) to anger via cultural threat is not statistically significant, nor is the path from SDO (again, conditional 
upon the treatment) to policy preferences via cultural threat then anger. We do not find this null result surprising, as 
the literature we draw upon to derive our hypotheses suggests that emotions should precede perceptions of threat in 
response to outgroups. That is, emotions are a mechDQLVPWKURXJKZKLFKDQRXWJURXS¶s offending behavior is 
translated into negative cognitions and harm-intending behaviors toward that outgroup. 
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STUDY 2 
 Although Study 1 provided an opportunity to observe how individuals react to cultural 
transaction costs, it was not designed to observe individual preferences over how these costs 
should be distributed to overcome cultural barriers. As a result, we designed Study 2 to test the 
asymmetrical accommodation, disengagement, and venting hypotheses by placing study 
participants in an intergroup contact situation involving cultural transaction costs and providing 
them with the opportunity to personally accept or push these costs onto an outgroup member.   
Study Design and Procedure 
 Seventy one undergraduate students enrolled in political science courses at a large 
Northeastern university were recruited to participate in this observational study. Of the 71 
students who participated, there were slightly more females (55%) than males, 52% of subjects 
identified themselves as Caucasian, and ideology and party identification are nearly evenly 
distributed across the student sample, with a slight skew in favor of liberal and democratic 
identifiers. As in Study 1, subjects were informed that they were participating in a consumer 
UHVHDUFKVWXG\LQYHVWLJDWLQJSHRSOH¶VDWWLWXGHVWRZDUGFRPPHUFLDORUJRYHUQPHQWZHEVLWHV7KH
first section of Study 2 was the same as in Study 1, only this time the website was the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).  The main difference between Study 1 
and 2 is that the Internet navigation portion of Study 2 contained no experimental manipulation.  
Rather, after completing the 3 brief navigation tasks of the HUD website, which were entirely in 
English and involved no unexpected exposure to a Spanish language version of the HUD 
website, all subjects were then asked to participate in an online focus group discussion using a 
chat room environment.  
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To reinforce our cover story, participants were told that focus group discussions 
constitute a large part of conducting consumer research and provide a very useful method of 
learning about consumer evaluations and preferences. Participants were told that our research 
was being conducted at multiple sites, and that they were going to participate in a brief on-line 
³IRFXVJURXSVW\OH´FKDWZLWKDQRWKHUVWXGHQWSDUWLFLSDWLQJDWDVHSDUDWHXQLYHUVLW\,QUHDOLW\WKH
chat-room discussant was a computer program with a set of scripted questions for our subjects. 
In addition, subjects were told that given time and cost constraints, the discussion session would 
EHOLPLWHGWRDVKRUW³4XHVWLRQVDQG$QVZHUV´IRUPDW$OOSDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKHVWXG\ZHUH
assigned the role of answering 6 questions posed by their chat-room partner. For all study 
SDUWLFLSDQWVRIWKHTXHVWLRQVDVNHGE\WKH³GLVFXVVDQW´FRQWDLQHGVXEVWDQWLDOSRUWLRQVRIWKH
question in Spanish. For example, the first posted statement by the computerized chat discussant 
ZDV³just finished looking at some sites. qué website tuvistequebuscar?´7KHVHFRQGDQGILIWK
statements were entirely in English, while the third, fourth, and sixth statements were written 
half in Spanish in a fashion similar to the first example. 
The injection of Spanish into the chat was intended not only to simulate the type of brief, 
real-life encounters that Americans may have with immigrants who possess limited English-
language abilities, but it also served to construct an interactive social situation involving cultural 
transaction costs. For participants with little knowledge of Spanish, encountering these 
statements in a foreign language created a barrier to transacting²that is, responding to the 
GLVFXVVDQW¶VTXHVWLRQVDQG communicating more generally.  The main innovation of Study 2 is 
WKDWHYHU\SDUWLFLSDQWLQDGGLWLRQWREHLQJDEOHWRIUHHO\HQWHUDWH[WUHSO\WRWKHGLVFXVVDQW¶V
TXHVWLRQZDVDOVRSURYLGHGZLWKWZR³VFUHHQRSWLRQV´GHVLJQHGWRFDSWXUHDEDVLFGLIIHUHQFe in 
cultural accommodation behavior and preferences regarding the distribution of cultural 
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WUDQVDFWLRQFRVWV7ZREXWWRQVODEHOHG³5HWULHYH7UDQVODWRU´DQG³5HTXHVW7UDQVODWLRQ´ZHUH
available throughout the entire chat discussion.  Clicking on the former button opened up a new 
browser connecting subjects to an online Spanish-to-English translation website.  Clicking on the 
ODWWHUEXWWRQFDXVHGDPHVVDJHLQWKHFKDWGLVFXVVLRQWH[WER[WRSRSXSVWDWLQJ³3OHDVHKROGRQ
request for translation is being VHQW´7KHFKDWSURJUDPZDVGHVLJQHGWREHDVUHDOLVWLFDs 
possible; after waiting a little over a minute, the same question asked in partial Spanish by the 
chat discussant re-appeared in full (though imperfect) English.  Further, these options were not 
mXWXDOO\H[FOXVLYHFOLFNLQJRQRQHDWHDFK³UHVSRQVHURXQG´RIWKHTXHVWLRQVGLGQRWHOLPLQDWH
the option of selecting the other. 
This feature of Study 2 enabled XVWRXVHHDFKVXEMHFW¶VEHKDYLRUGXULQJWKHFKDWWR
generate a novel set of dependent variaEOHV7KH³5HWULHYH7UDQVODWRU´DQG³5HTXHVW
7UDQVODWLRQ´EXWWRQVZHUHPDGHDYDLODEOHWRREVHUYHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶ZLOOLQJQHVVWRUHVROYHWKH
cultural transaction barriers by incurring the costs in time and effort associated with translating 
Spanish to English, or pushing these costs onto the chat discussant by requesting they translate 
their statement into English.  We view the choice over these two options as a behavioral 
LQGLFDWRURIVXEMHFWV¶ZLOOLQJQHVVWRFXOWXUDOO\DFFRPPRGDWHRXWJURXSVE\LQFXUULQJWUDQsaction 
costs.  Conversely, the act of pushing the costs onto an outgroup member, as indicated by 
VHOHFWLRQRIWKH³5HTXHVW7UDQVODWLRQ´RSWLRQLVYLHZHGDVDQDFWLYHHIIRUWE\LQGLYLGXDOVWR
avoid cost incurrence and be accommodated by a member of a cultural outgroup. 
Measures 
)RXULQLWLDOGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHVZHUHGHULYHGIURPVXEMHFWV¶EHKDYLRUGXULQJWKHFKDW
discussion.  First, we constructed dichotomous push and incur variables.  The push variable was 
FRGHG³´LIDVXEMHFWVHOHFWHGWKH³5HTXHVW7UDQVODWLRQ´EXWWRQDWOHDVWRQFHGXULQJWKHFRXUVH
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RIWKHFKDWDQG³´RWKHUZLVHWKHLQFXUYDULDEOHZDVVLPLODUO\FRGHG³´LIWKHVXEMHFWVHOHFWHG
WKH³5HWULHYH7UDQVODWRU´EXWWRQDWOHDVWRQFHGXULQJWKHFRXUVHRIWKHFKDW,QWRWDOURXJKO\
49% of participants pushed at least once during the course of the chat, and 51% of subjects 
incurred transaction costs at least one time.  The dichotomous push and incur variables were 
moderately negatively correlated (-.55) with one another.  Second, we created variables counting 
the number of times each behavioral option was selected, rendering pushcount and incurcount 
variables, each ranging from 0 to 4 (because subjects only received 4 questions in partial Spanish 
and no subjects clicked either button more than 4 times).  Each of these count variables had a 
slight polar bimodal distribution, revealing a tendency among participants to either fully engage 
or abstain from engaging in one of these two behaviors in response to each instance of 
encountering the Spanish-language barrier.  
In addition to observing individual cultural accommodation behavior toward the chat 
discussant, we also recorded all typed responses from each subject to the chat discussant, which 
we used to calculate word counts.  The number of words, and WKXVWKHGHJUHHRI³WDONDWLYHQHVV´
of each subject to the chat discussant, was used as an indicator of social engagement versus 
withdrawal from the interaction with the discussant.6  We first constructed a variable measuring 
the total number of words used E\HDFKVXEMHFWDFURVVWKHLUUHVSRQVHVWRWKHFKDWGLVFXVVDQWV¶
questions.  Next, to control for the fact that some questions asked by the computerized discussant 
solicited short responses, we created an average of the words used by each subject across their 6 
responses. These two variables served as the dependent variables for our test of the 
disengagement hypothesis.To test the venting hypothesis, all participants answered 4 questions 
tapping anger; as in Study 1, we asked subjects the extent to which they were presently feeling 
                                                 
6
 While passive harm and friendliness are typically gauged with measures of eye contact, smiling, spatial distance, 
and body language (Cuddy et al., 2007; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, and Williams, 1995), such measures are unavailable 
to us given the interaction in cyber space rather than in person.  
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³XSVHW´³KRVWLOH´³LUULWDEOH´DQG³GLVWUHVVHG´7KHVHIRXULWHPVZHUHFRPELQHGLQWRDVLQJOH
VXPPDWLYHVFDOHĮ DQGUHFRGHGWRUDQJHIURPWR KLJKDQJHU; M=.16, SD=.19).   
To assess the role of individual social dominance motives in shaping accommodation 
behavior, disengagement, and the experience of negative emotions, we relied upon the same 8-
item measure of SDO utilized in Study 1.  These items were combined into a single scale ranging 
from 0 to 1 (1=high SDO; M=.38, SD=.19), yielding an inter-item reliabiOLW\RIĮ :HDOVR
interacted SDOwith a dichotomous item asking subjects whether English is their primary 
language spoken at home.  The purpose of this interaction was to provide a strong mechanism for 
ensuring that the Spanish-language manipulation encountered during the chat truly constituted an 
unknown language, and thus an obstacle to communication. Therefore, while the asymmetrical 
accommodation hypothesis predicts that individuals higher in SDO will be more likely to push 
costs onto outgroup members, this prediction only holds when these individuals are truly being 
confronted with an unfamiliar language (i.e., cultural transaction costs).7 
We used the same set of control variables from Study 1, with the addition of two 
variables not included in the first study that may be of theoretical importance. First, we include 
an 11-item measure of openness to experience to control for individual differences in the 
propensity to seek out novelty and new stimuli, such as a foreign culture.  These items were 
coPELQHGLQWRDVLQJOHVFDOHWKDWZDVUHFRGHGWRUDQJHIURPWRĮ  KLJKRSHQQHVV
Second, intergroup contact theory (Allport 1954; Brown, 1995) suggests that having recurrent 
exposure to a foreign language within the context of RQH¶VIULHQGVKLSQHtwork should reduce the 
experience of language-based threats. To control for this possibility, we included an item asking 
respondents about the percentage of close friends in their social network who were raised 
speaking a language other than English (1=100%). 
                                                 
7
 When re-running all models in Study 2 on participants that spoke only English, all of the main results hold.  
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Results 
  To test the asymmetrical accommodation hypothesis, we analyzed the dichotomous push 
and incur variables, as well as the push and incur count variables, using logistic and ordered 
logistic regression.8 As hypothesized, among participants who primarily speak English, higher 
levels of social dominance motives was associated with a significant increase in the probability 
of pushing cultural transaction costs onto the Spanish-speaking (computerized) chat discussant 
(B=4.12, SE=1.81; see Table 2).  Indeed, not only were high-SDOs more likely to push at least 
once, theywere more likely to push often: higher levels of SDO was associated with a significant 
increase in theprobability of pushing costs to each of the 4 questions asked in partial Spanish 
(B=3.35, SE=1.56). Moreover, high-SDOs who only speak English were significantly less likely 
to culturally accommodate their chat discussant by retrieving the Spanish-to-English translator 
(Incur Dummy: B= -5.49, SE=1.98; Incur Count: B= -4.14, SE=1.60). To further explicate these 
results, we plotted predicted probabilities in Figure 2. 
Our intuition behind the interaction of SDO with language usage is confirmed by the four 
significant interaction terms.While SDO is associated with asymmetrical accommodation 
behavior among those speaking primarily English, this relationship is significantly attenuated 
among those high in SDO who speak a language other than English.  Although possessing the 
ability to speak a language other than English does not mean that these participants could speak 
Spanish, it does likely impart familiarity with and tolerance for foreign language exposure. Of 
the controls in these models, the only other variable that exerted some influence over cultural 
accommodation behavior was openness to experience.  The results reveal that moving from the 
                                                 
8
 To address the loss of large sample properties associated with Maximum Likelihood Estimation with samples 
smaller than N=200, and thus any potential bias in our estimates, we re-ran these regressions using Weighted Least 
Squares (WLS). WLS applied to regression with dichotomous and ordinal dependent variables provide consistent 
coefficient estimates and correct standard errors. In each of the four models, the sign and significance of the 
coefficients for SDO and the interaction term remained unchanged.  
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minimum to the maximum level of openness is associated with a marginally significant decrease 
in the probability of pushing cultural transaction costs and a significant increase in the 
probability of incurring such costs upon each encounter of Spanish-language-usage by the chat 
discussant.  
 Moving on, we tested the disengagement hypothesis using a negative binomial regression 
of total and average words used by participants during the chat discussion.9Across both of these 
models, we found that higher levels of social dominance motives among English-speaking 
participants is associated with asignificant decrease in verbal engagement with the chat 
discussant, as indicated by the total words spoken (B= -.77, SE=.46) and the average words 
spoken (B= -.75, SE=.45). Our analyses also uncoveredmarginally significant interaction terms 
(total words: B=1.40, SE=1.0; average words: B=1.3, SE=1.0), revealing that the propensity of 
high SDOs to disengage with an outgroup member is significantly attenuated as we move from 
participants who primarily speak English to those who speak languages other than English. 
These findings provide support for our disengagement hypothesis, and reveal that the link 
between SDO and withdrawal from social interaction with a cultural outgroup member was 
conditional upon SDUWLFLSDQWV¶PRQROLQJXDOLVPDQGlanguage-based barriers to social 
interaction.10 
 Up until now, we have demonstrated that participants high in SDO became angrier in 
response to encountering cultural transaction costs and pushed these costs onto outgroup 
members when given the opportunity.  A remaining question, then, is whether engaging in this 
type of culturally non-accommodative behavior, and thus presumably expressing social 
                                                 
9
 Again, to address the loss of large sample properties, we re-ran these regressions using Weighted Least Squares 
(WLS), and the sign and significance of the coefficients for SDO and the interaction terms remained unchanged. 
10
 While our results provide support for the disengagement hypothesis, we should note that an alternative account for 
our findings that is supported by the personality literature is that individuals high in SDO are generally less 
agreeable and friendly (Akrami and Ekehammar, 2006).  
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dominance by being accommodated by the chat discussant, served to reduce the negative 
emotions high-SDOsfeel in response to experiencing cultural barriers.  The results presented in 
Table 3, in support of the venting hypothesis, suggest that this is indeed the case.  Four OLS 
regressions testedthe interactive effect of SDO and chat behavior on anger.  Note that for these 
analyses, we centered the SDO scale on high-SDOs (i.e., it is reversed coded) so that the 
coefficient for each type of chat behavior could be interpreted for those highest in SDO (for a 
detailed explanation, see Jaccard &Turrisi,2003). The regression coefficients listed in Panel I 
reveal that, among participants highest in SDO, pushing cultural transaction costsat least once 
during the chat is associated with a significant decrease in the experience of anger-oriented 
negative emotions.  More specifically, the negatively signed coefficient for SDO reveals that, 
among participants who did not push costs at all during the chat, those low in SDO felt 
significantly lessangry than those high in SDO.  Moreover, the interaction term tells us that the 
marginal effect of pushing at least once during the chatsignificantly differs based upon levels of 
SDO; the interaction coefficient indicates that as the level of SDO among participantsmoves 
from its highest to lowest values, pushing costs onto the chat discussant was associated with 
higher levels of negative emotions.  This pattern held when analyzing the effect of the frequency 
of push behavior, though these results failed to obtain statistical significance. 
Moving on to the effects of cost-incurring behavior (see Panels III and IV, Table 3), we 
see that individuals high in SDO that culturally accommodate the Spanish-speaking chat 
discussant experienced significantly higher levels of anger.  This effect was only statistically 
significant, however, when analyzing the frequency of accommodation behavior (Panel IV). This 
caveat aside, these results suggest that high-SDO participants that acted against their tendency to 
push and instead incurred costs, perhaps out of social desirability or politeness concerns, 
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nonetheless feltmore angry after doing so.The marginally significant interaction term in Panel IV 
indicates that the anger bolstering effect of incurring among those high in SDO is attenuated as 
we move to those lower in SDO.  
Discussion 
The general picture painted by this last set of analyses on emotions is one in which high-
SDOsare seemingly able to vent their anger in response to cultural transaction costs by engaging 
in asymmetrical accommodation behavior toward cultural outgroups, whereby the cultural 
accommodation of outgroups is avoided and cultural accommodation from outgroups is asserted.  
Among those who did not seize upon the opportunity to push costs onto the chat discussant, 
those high in SDO were significantly more angry than those low in SDO. We believe that 
engaging in this type of asymmetrical behavior serves as a strong expression and bolstering of 
social dominance. The results demonstrate that among participants lacking such dominance 
motives, engaging in non-accommodative behavior arouses, rather than assuages, negative 
emotions²suggesting an absence of the same emotional and symbolic functions and utility for 
this behavior that exist for those high in SDO.  Last, the results reveal an interesting caveat: In 
the case of pushing costs, venting among those high in SDO appears to be a function of simply 
engaging in the behavior rather than how many times the behavior is performed.  For cost-
incurring behavior, the reverse is found: Incurring once did not seem to lead high SDO 
individuals to become significantly angrier; however, repeatedly incurring costs, likely against 
their desire to push, led these high-SDOsto experience significantly greater levels of anger.   
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this article, we have argued that one important aspect of the cultural politics of 
immigration centers upon native-born FLWL]HQV¶ attempts to manage the emergence and 
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incurrence of cultural transaction costs.  The issue of distributing these cultural transaction costs 
across native-born citizens and immigrant groups activates both tangible and symbolic concerns. 
The tangible concerns activated by the distribution of cultural transaction costs pertain to 
practical considerations of who will incur the costs required to reconcile cultural differences to 
enable effective intergroup interactions and exchange.  The symbolic concerns reflect 
competition for group status, as well as the expression of social dominance by cultural majority 
group members.  Political conflict over language policy, bilingual education, and 
multiculturalism in general, according to our perspective, is intimately linked to the fact that 
these policies address the real distribution of cultural transaction costs.  By determining who has 
to assimilate to whom and by how much, these policiesalso stand as potent symbols of group 
status and social dominance. 
The findings from our studies demonstrate the relevance of social dominance motives to 
the cultural politics of immigration in several important respects.  First, we demonstrate in Study 
1 that variation in social dominance motives has a significant relationship to how individuals 
emotionally react to an unfamiliar culture as a barrier to completing basic day-to-day tasks (i.e., 
cultural transaction costs).  Through this relationship, Study 1 ultimately charts a causal 
sequence that connects social dominance motives and real intercultural experiences to 
preferences over macro-level government policies intended to shape the amount and distribution 
of cultural transaction costs.  Second, paralleling the linkage between SDO and preferences over 
³ZKRDFFRmmodates who´DWWKHSROLF\OHYHO, Study 2 demonstrates that at the interpersonal 
level, social dominance motives exert a significant effect onengagement in culturally 
accommodative behavior toward acultural minority group member.  And last, these two results 
are linked by the finding that avoiding the cultural accommodation of an outgroup member and 
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procuring accommodation from them (i.e., asymmetrical cultural accommodation) results in a 
significant reduction of negative emotions for those high in SDO.   
In addition to supporting our theory of the cultural politics of immigration, the findings 
from our studies make an important contribution to the opinion research on immigration.  More 
specifically, we demonstrate how individual difference factors and environmental experiences 
may interact to produce threat perceptions of known relevance to immigration policy 
preferences.  Rather than simplyutilizing cultural threat as a predictor of immigration policy 
preferences while leaving WKHIRUPHU¶VRULJLQV as unknown, we present theory and findings that 
depict cultural threat perceptions as a negative cognitive appraisal resulting from anger triggered 
by personality and experiential factors.  Beyond these contributions to the immigration literature, 
the results from our studies contribute to the work on social dominance theory by extending it 
further into the study of opinion on immigration than previous SDO research. In addition to 
linking SDO to immigration attitudes, we translate the asymmetrical in-group bias prediction 
into the asymmetrical accommodation hypothesis and demonstrate that SDO has important 
impacts on substantively important behavior toward cultural minority group members.  
While the studies in this article relied upon exposure to Spanish as the key induction of 
cultural transaction costs, we view our theory as trans-contextual in that we would expect our 
results to hold for any cultural outgroup. This said, the evidence presented in our studies relies 
upon Spanishand thus alludes to Hispanic immigrants only; therefore, our ability to conclude that 
the dynamics observed in our studies would generalize to all immigrant minorities is limited by 
our data. As is the case in many other nations, immigration in the U.S.is highly racialized, as 
Hispanics are the largest and fastest growing (Passel, Cohn, and Lopez 2011), as well as the most 
salient and stigmatized (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Chavez 2008; Chomsky 2007; 
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Domke, McCoy, and Torres 1999),of the immigrant groups currently entering and residing in the 
country. Given the racializationof immigration, as well as variation in the social status of 
different immigrant groups, it is possible, and of interest for future research, to assess whether 
the results observed in our studies would hold for a wider range of immigrant groups.  Our 
theory suggests that our results should hold for any immigrant group whose cultural distance 
from the native culture is sufficient to induce cultural transaction costs; however, future research 
is needed to empirically test whether the effects of transaction costs on the attitudes and 
behaviors observed in our studies would hold when reassessed among less stigmatized and/or 
higher status immigrant groups. Future research could build upon our work by employingan 
experimental design that manipulates the cultural distance, ethnic identity, and social status (e.g. 
education, occupational skills, etc.) of the immigrant groups encountered by study participants, 
thus enabling researchers to determine whether the effects observed in our study are driven 
solely by the cultural distance of an immigrant group, or whether racial or ethnic identity is 
indeed an operative factor as well. 
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Table 1. The Mediated Effect of SDO & Web Spanish Treatment On Policy Preferences 
 
 
Anger 
Scale  
Cultural 
Threat 
Deport 
Illegals 
Official 
English 
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) 
 
.340*  .471 2.11* 1.36 
 
 (.171)  (.724) (.847) (.902) 
Treatment dummy (0=Treatment)  .095  .131 .555 .309 
 
 (.093)  (.455) (.388) (.386) 
SDO x Treatment Dummy 
 
-.474*  .338 -1.23 -1.64 
 
 (.229)  (.986) (1.04) (1.03) 
Anger Scale 
 
- - -  .920* -.583 -.106 
 
 
  (.426) (.457) (.452) 
Cultural Threat 
 
-- -  -- - .343*** .320** 
 
 
   (.106) (.116) 
Gender 
 
-.036  .050 -.028 -.346 
 
 (.053)  (.253) (.228) (.253) 
White 
 
-.228***  .025 .121 -.104 
 
 (.059)  (.334) (.319) (.281) 
Spanish Language Ability 
 
-.023  -.507 -.075 -.566 
 
 (.088)  (.369) (.414) (.391) 
Foreign Born Parents 
 
-.044  -.896*** .328 -.146 
 
 (.058)  (.271) (.269) (.289) 
Ideology 
 
.269***  .973 -.477 .088 
 
 (.078)  (.736) (.434) (.342) 
National Identity 
 
-.1  .908* 1.09* 1.36*** 
 
 (.078)  (.476) (.461) (.442) 
INDIRECT EFFECT:       
Social Dominance Orientation       
Estimate  -- -  .313 .107 .100 
     (S.E.)    (.215) (.078) (.074) 
Notes: N = 111. Because Mplus treats categorical dependent variables as latent variables, the coefficient estimates for the Cultural Threat, 
Deport Illegals, and Official Languageequationsrepresent the standard deviation unit change in the latent variable underlying the ordered 
response dependent variable associated with a unit change in the independent variable.  For the Anger Scale equation, entries are 
unstandardized regression coefficients. The estimated indirect effect of SDO is the effect of going from the minimum to maximum value of 
SDO among those in the treatment condition. Reported p-values for test of indirect effects are based upon one-tailed hypothesis tests. All 
other significance levels are based on two-tailed hypothesis tests, S*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Figure 1:  Path Diagram of Anger and Mediation Hypotheses 
 
Panel A. Theoretical Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Results from Structural Equation Model 
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Figure 2.Predicted Probability of Cultural Accommodation Behavior among English-Speaking 
Subjects 
 
 
 
Notes: Predicted probabilities were calculated from logistic regression models presented in Table 2.  
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Table 2. The Effect of Social Dominance on Cultural Accommodation Behavior  
 
 
Push 
Dummy 
Push 
Count 
Incur 
Dummy 
Incur 
Count 
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) 
 
4.12* 3.35* -5.49** -4.14** 
 
 (1.81) (1.56) (1.98) (1.60) 
Language Dummy   
(0=English Main Language) 
 
4.75** 3.40* -5.06** -4.94** 
 
 (1.72) (1.42) (1.82) (1.71) 
SDO x Language Dummy  -10.98** -8.17* 11.43** 13.91*** 
 
 (4.04) (3.50) (4.13) (4.16) 
Gender  -.855 -.760 .549 .482 
 
 (.629) (.556) (.658) (.555) 
White  .340 4.24 .409 .278 
 
 (.684) (.593) (.726) (.634) 
Foreign Born Parents  .567 .588 -1.04 - 
 
 (.707) (.645) (.751) (.660) 
Ideology   -1.61 -1.60 .151 1.02 
 
 (1.45) (1.22) (1.46) (1.29) 
Party ID  .828 1.01 -.080 -.302 
 
 (1.22) (1.07) (1.24) (1.10) 
National Identity  1.26 .617 1.09 .251 
 
 (1.38) (1.20) (1.44) (1.24) 
Open to Experience  - -2. 1.45 2.91* 
 
 (1.50) (1.25) (1.49) (1.39) 
Contact with ESL Speakers  -.930 -.423 2.30* 1.19 
 
 (.985) (.859) (1.09) (.818) 
 
 
    
Notes:  N = 71. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from logistic regressions (Push Dummy and Incur Dummy) and ordered 
logistic regressions (Push Count and Incur Count).Reported significance levels are based on two-tailed hypothesis tests, S*p<.05, 
**p<.01, ***p<.001. 
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Table 3.  Moderated Effect of Chat Behavior by SDO On 
Negative Emotions 
 
 
  
 
 ȕ (SE) 
A.    
Push  -.307* (.141) 
SDO (reversed)  -.532** (.168) 
Push x SDO  .463* (.229) 
 
 
  
B.    
Push Count  -.240 (.180) 
SDO (reversed)  -.439* (.165) 
Push Count x SDO  .382 (.296) 
 
 
  
C.    
Incur  .118 (.147) 
SDO (reversed)  -.293 (.183) 
Incur x SDO  -.101 (.238) 
 
 
  
D.    
Incur Count   (.167) 
SDO (reversed)  -.129 (.173) 
Incur Count x SDO  - (.280) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Notes:  N=71. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from OLS regressions, with 
standard errors are in parentheses and p-values in brackets.  Each of the 4 models included 
controls for gender, race, income, foreign born parents, ideology, party ID, openness to 
experience, and national identity.   Reported p-values are based upon two-tailed hypothesis 
tests.S*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
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APPENDIX A 
SDO Question Wording 
 
Social Dominance Orientation (Study1 and Study 2) 
(1) Some groups of people are simply inferior to others 
(2) In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups 
(3) To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups 
(4) Inferior groups should stay in their place 
(5) Group equality should be our ideal  
(6) We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups 
(7) We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally 
(8) We should strive to make income as equal as possible 
Response Options: (1)-³6WURQJO\$JUHH-³$JUHH´-³8QFHUWDLQ´-³'LVDJUHH´-
³6WURQJO\'LVDJUHH´ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
APPENDIX B 
Correlations between Key Variables 
 
 
Study 1 
SDO scale 1.00 
        Treatment -0.01 1.00 
       Anger scale 0.16 0.09 1.00 
      Cultural Threat 0.13 -0.02 0.18 1.00 
     Deport Illegals 0.25 -0.06 -0.07 0.33 1.00 
    Official English 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.41 0.45 1.00 
   Ideology 0.25 0.02 0.21 0.34 0.11 0.23 1.00 
  National Identity 0.01 0.01 -0.07 0.30 0.30 0.39 0.31 1.00 
 Spanish Ability 0.17 -0.17 0.06 -0.12 -0.02 -0.19 -0.01 0.10 1.00 
Notes:  N=111. Entries are zero-RUGHUFRUUHODWLRQV7UHDWPHQWLVWKHGLFKRWRPRXVH[SHULPHQWDOFRQGLWLRQYDULDEOHFRGHG³´IRU
WKRVHUHFHLYLQJWKHWUHDWPHQWDQG³´IRUWKRVHLQWKHFRQWUROJURXS 
 
 
 
 
Study 2 
SDO scale 1.00 
       Language -0.14 1.00 
      Negative Emotions 0.12 0.23 1.00 
     National Identity 0.20 -0.30 -0.08 1.00 
    Openness scale -0.02 0.12 0.13 -0.01 1.00 
   Ideology 0.52 -0.19 -0.13 0.40 0.04 1.00 
  Party ID 0.41 0.08 -0.10 0.27 0.12 0.74 1.00 
 Contact with ESL Speakers 0.16 0.41 0.16 -0.06 0.06 0.09 0.17 1.00 
Notes: N=71. Entries are zero-RUGHUFRUUHODWLRQV/DQJXDJHLVWKHGLFKRWRPRXVODQJXDJHYDULDEOHFRGHG³´IRUIRUHLJQ
ODQJXDJHVSHDNHUVDQG³´IRU(QJOLVK-only speakers.  
 
